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NEBULOUS INJUNCTION DECREES AGAINST
NOISE-NUISANCES
Meadowbrook Swimming Club v. Albert'
Defendant-appellant corporation operated a public out-
door dance floor upon its property situated in a narrow val-
ley bordered on two sides by residential districts. Modern
jazz music was played in the summer months from nine to
twelve, on six nights of the week. Persistent complaints
about the noise were made by the surrounding residential
property owners; and after alleviatory efforts on the part
of the defendant had failed to produce the necessary quiet,
the property owners filed a bill in equity to enjoin the con-
tinuation of an alleged noise nuisance. A decree was
granted permanently restraining the defendant from "the
playing of loud music, or the creation of similar noises in
such manner that the noise made by the same is transmitted
on the properties of the Plaintiffs, or any of them, so as to
deprive the Plaintiffs and the members of their families
from the reasonable use and comfortable enjoyment of their
respective homes." On appeal, held: Affirmed. A business
not a nuisance per se may be so conducted as to be subject
to injunctive restraint. Noise alone, even if produced by
skilled musicians, may constitute a nuisance where it inter-
feres with the reasonable enjoyment by another of his
property.
The principles of equitable relief against nuisance
caused by the misuse of one's property in relation to that
of another are well recognized and established in the field
of the law.2 The Maryland statement of the general rule
may be found in Dittman v. Repp,8 where the court said:
"A court of equity will interfere and restain by
injunction an existing or threatened nuisance to a
party's dwelling, if the injury be of such a character
as to diminish materially the value of the property as
a dwelling, and seriously interfere with the ordinary
1173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146 (1938).
2 See Joyce, Law of Nuisances, See. 415.
3 50 Md. 519 (1879). See also Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123 (1873).
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comfort and enjoyment of it, and if the injury be such
as to entitle the party complaining to substantial dam-
ages in an action at law . . .
"In all such cases, the question is whether the nui-
sance complained of, will or does produce such a con-
dition of things as, in the judgment of reasonable men,
is naturally productive of actual physical discomfort
to persons of ordinary sensibilities, and of ordinary
tastes and habits, and as, in view of the circumstances
of the case, is unreasonable and in derogation of the
rights of the complainant."
The solution of any noise-nuisance problem depends in
a large measure upon the balancing of the conflicting rights
of the parties; and this, in turn, will naturally hinge upon
the circumstances of each individual case. A brief review
of several Maryland decisions dealing with injunctive relief
against noise in general will serve to illustrate the general
application of the principles enunciated. It is, of course,
obvious that noise is but one of the means whereby a nui-
sance may be created, and that principles applicable to
other types of nuisance will, in the main, be applicable to
the particular type in question. However, the inherent dif-
ferences in the circumstances surrounding the various nui-
sance media make a separate study interesting and in-
structive.
In Dittman v. Repp,' the parties to the injunctive pro-
ceeding occupied adjoining premises in the city of Balti-
more. The plaintiff lived with his family upon his. prop-
erty; the defendant operated a brewery upon his. The de-
fendant used steam machinery in its building, the steam
pipes running alongside the plaintiff's wall. The noise was
not only loud, but had a heavy jarring quality. An injunc-
tion was granted. The court said that urban inhabitants
must expect to encounter and to endure certain inconveni-
ences inherently related to their manner of life, but that
there was a limit to the discomforts, to be met; and that
noise alone might create a nuisance subject to equitable in-
junction, although the clamor might result from the carry-
ing on of a trade or business in the city.
In Lohmuller v. S. Kirk & Son Co.,5 the plaintiffs, at-
torneys, occupied offices in the Calvert Building in Balti-
'Supra, n. 3.
s 133 Md. 78, 104 A. 270 (1918).
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more. The defendant inhabited an adjacent building where-
in it engaged in the hammering of silver upon iron bars
during the office hours of the plaintiffs. The latter sought
an injunction against the noise which, in the words of one
of the complainants, was described as follows: "It is a
peculiar penetrating noise. It goes right through you, it
affects the nerves, it is a nerve-racking noise. It is almost
enough to give you nervous prostration." The injunction
was refused. The court recited the general principles,
namely, that the court should take into consideration not
only the character of the noise, but the locality in which
it was produced, and that not every inconvenience in the
nature of a nuisance would call for equitable relief. It
was emphasized that the plaintiffs were tenants with com-
paratively short leases, that the alleged nuisance existed
in the business section of the city, and that while the noise
apparently subjected the plaintiffs to some annoyance and
discomfort, it was not clearly shown that the noise com-
plained of was productive of actual physical discomfort to
a person of ordinary sensibilities.
In Singer v. James,6 where the adjoining property own-
ers resided in a suburban district, the defendant was in the
business of raising for sale poultry, hogs, and dogs. The
plaintiff, whose land was improved by a dwelling house,
sought an injunction against the noise caused by the bark-
ing and whining of the dogs, in particular, and against other
animal disturbances in general. The defendant was en-
joined from keeping on his premises "such a great num-
ber of fowls, hogs and dogs that the noise made by the same
shall deprive the plaintiff and members of his family from
the reasonable use and comfortable enjoyment of the plain-
tiff's property . . ."7
Somewhat more pertinent to the particular problem of
the principal case are certain out-of-state decisions dealing
with noise-nuisance as related to recreational operations.
In Phelps v. Winch,' an injunction was sought to restrain
the defendant from operating a dance pavilion near the
6 130 Md. 382, 100 A. 642 (1917).
7 For other cases involving noise-nuisance, see Green v. Shoemaker, II
Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909) ; and Langley v. McGeoch, 115 Md. 182, 80 A. 843
(1911). These cases involve relief against blasting operations. While
noise was a part of the trouble complained against, perhaps the greater
part consisted of the menace of rocks and stones falling on the plaintiff's
premises.
8 309 Ill. 158, 140 N. E. 847, 28 A. L. R. 1169 (1923).
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summer country residences of the plaintiffs. In the words
of the court, "music was furnished by four college boys,
with a piano, saxophone, banjo and drum, and was the char-
acter of music suited to the present day methods of danc-
ing, called 'jazz' music." The noise of which the plaintiffs
complained consisted of the music, laughter, applause, the
making of announcements, the shuffling of feet, the noise
and confusion incident to the breaking up of the dance, such
as calling back and forth, the starting of cars and the blow-
ing of horns. The plaintiffs alleged that their ordinary con-
versations and their sleep were greatly interfered with.
The defendant was enjoined from operating the pavilion in
such a manner as to interfere with the reasonable enjoy-
ment of life by the plaintiffs and other persons of ordinary
sensibilities occupying their premises. The court said that
as the nuisance was clearly established, there was no neces-
sity of proceeding first at law; for the injury was such that
damages would not be adequate relief."0
In Gilbough v. West Side Amusement Co.," injunctive
relief was sought to restrain a noise nuisance arising from
the close proximity of a baseball park to the residences
of the plaintiffs. The park was operated on Sunday, and
the plaintiffs alleged that the shouts and stampings inci-
dent to baseball-spectator activity so disturbed their rest
as to constitute an unlawful and inequitable obstruction to
the enjoyment of their property. The court stated that, in
modern civilization, people were forced to endure those
noise annoyances which should reasonably arise from the
necessary operations of society, and that the necessity and
purpose of any given noise would be a factor in determin-
ing whether it constituted a nuisance. The court also
pointed out the time relation involved. Here, the noise was
particularly disturbing on Sundays when the complainants
were trying to rest. An injunction was granted restraining
the defendant from allowing the production of such noise
at that particular time. The court, in stating that mere
9 For another interesting recent case dealing with noise-nuisance as in-
cident to public dances, see Bartlett v. Moats, 120 Fla. 61, 162 So. 477
(1935). See also for a discussion of the instant problem (1936) 15 Oregon
L. Rev. 268, and Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, (1934) 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 567.
10 See Woodyear v. Shaefer, 57 Md. 12 (1881). In that case the Court
said, "where a nuisance operates to destroy health, or to impair the com-
fortable enjoyment of property, an action at law furnishes no adequate
remedy, and protection by injunction must be given."
11 64 N. J. Eq. 27, 53 A. 289 (1902).
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noise may constitute a nuisance, said that the occurrence
of constant disagreeable noise was not conducive to mental
health, especially when it tended to break up sleep and rest.
In Edmunds v. Duff,12 a suit was brought in equity to
restrain the proposed erection of an amusement park in a
residential section,13 to be operated day and night for six
months of the year. The alleged prospective disturbances
included music, shooting galleries, dance halls, restaurants
and electric lights. In granting an injunction, the Court
said:
"Even music, however elevating and enjoyable at
times, and depending, of course, on its character, may
be continued so long as to become an annoyance to
those compelled to remain in the immediate vicinity.
In fact, the general trend of decisions has been to hold
that any noise, whether of musical instruments or the
human voice, or by mechanical means, or however
produced, may be a nuisance, especially if its tendency
is to draw together in the vicinity of a person's resi-
dence or place of business large crowds of noisy and
disorderly people."
In Peragallo v. Luner,14 an injunction was granted to
the plaintiff restaurant owner to restrain noise and vibra-
tion caused by the operation of a bowling alley. The court
said that noise alone might constitute a nuisance, but that
in determining the question, the character and volume, and
time and place and duration of its occurrence must be reck-
oned with.
The foregoing digelst of case material does not, of
course, exhaust the situations in which noise nuisances may
be created. It merely serves to show how the general equit-
able principles have been applied in particular instances.
The equity court necessarily acts upon consideration of
the whole picture, and the combination of the factors in-
volved is the basis of the decision. The result obtained in
the principal case is in harmony with the prior Maryland
decisions, as well as with those of other states. A residen-
tial district was affected; the noise occurred inconveniently
12 280 Pa. 355, 124 A. 489,33 A. L. R. 719 (1924).
11 See Hamilton Corporation v. Julian, 130 Md. 597, 101 A. 558 (1917), in-
volving an injunction to restrain a threatened nuisance.
1499 N. J. Eq. 726, 133 A. 543 (1926).
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at night ;15 the disturbance was unquestionably annoying in
character and volume. The trial court summarized the sit-
uation as follows:
"The blare of the brasses, the beating of the drums
• . . is so penetrating and loud that it cannot be ques-
tioned that witnesses, who are doubtless normally con-
stituted, and of exceptional integrity and intelligence,
who live on the sides of the hills and the plateau, have
been unable to sleep, to study, or otherwise lead normal
lives in their own homes for four evenings a week dur-
ing the past and present summers."
Serious difficulty is encountered as to the character and
form of the decree to restrain a noise-nuisance as well as
in various other equity cases. The definiteness and finality
characteristic of a common law judgment are the exception,
and not the rule, where an equity decision is concerned.
This is, of course, inherent in the nature of things. The
equitable principles involved in nuisance situations are
broad in scope and largely depend upon the somewhat deli-
cate balancing of conflicting rights and interests. In grant-
ing an injunction in such instances, the court cannot with
propriety ignore the rights of the defendant figuratively re-
posing on the upper half of the scale. When restrictions
are placed upon the right of the defendant to use his prop-
erty, principles of equity and justice demand that said re-
strictions go no farther than the circumstances actually
warrant. When they go beyond this point, the defendant
has as just cause for complaint as the plaintiff may have
had in the first instance. Improper restraints imposed in
such cases by judicial fiat are really more objectionable
from the standpoint of a sound social policy than affirma-
tive tortious acts of a nuisance defendant. In the former
situation, redress is precluded by reason of the very de-
cree which has established the wrong. This injustice is
readily apparent when considered in the abstract, but it is
nevertheless not easily obviated where concrete cases are
concerned.
The relation which the form of an equity decree bears
to the problem is not difficult to ascertain. Where a decree,
1
'
5 in Gilbough v. West Side Amusement Co., upra n. 11, the Court
stated: "By common consent of civilized man the night is dedicated to rest
and sleep, and noises which would not be adjudged nuisances under the
circumstances, if made in the daytime, will be declared to be nuisances if
made at night."
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in a nuisance case particularly, is so indefinite and uncer-
tain that the defendant cannot reasonably discover where
the line must be drawn,"6 it may quite easily have the prac-
tical effect of restricting the defendant's proper use of his
premises. The defendant is likely to lean backwards with
a natural reluctance to expose himself to the ever present
possibility of the contempt penalty. Such a decree may
be tantamount to a flat prohibition where none was actually
intended by the court. Thus the form of the decree affects
its substantial character.
But it is often far from a simple matter properly to
frame a decree in a nuisance case, once the court has de-
cided to grant an injunction. In looking at some of the
cases, one may readily imagine that the court found it far
less difficult to discover the presence of a nuisance than to
point out the proper steps to abate it. Each individual case
is apt to be specially complicated by the different circum-
stances involved.
The attitude of the courts in regard to the instant prob-
lem has not been uniform.' Some have embraced the diffi-
culty with frank misgivings, but have endeavoured to do
substantial justice. Others have seemingly ignored the dif-
ficulties and have left the defendant in an embarrassing
and equivocal position. In the absence of bad faith on the
part of the defendant, this latter course on the part of the
courts would seem to be legally indefensible. It overlooks
the correlative rights of the defendant while imposing an
onerous burden upon him.
The Maryland Court of Appeals likewise has been some-
what inconsistent in its approach to the problem. In
the same year there appeared Washington Cleaners and
Dyers v. Albrecht,8 sustaining, and International Pocket-
book Workers' Union v. Orlove,"9 condemning, a nebulous
decree. While the cases may be distinguished on their
facts, the nature of the decree called for in each (as being
definite or general) was part of the same problem found
in the instant case.
In Washington Cleaners and Dyers v. Albrecht, the de-
fendant was faced with the task of abating a nuisance
16 See Note, Nebulous Injunctions (1920) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 83, for a gen-
eral comment upon the desirability of a definite decree.
17 Ibid.
1s 157 Md. 389, 146 A. 233 (1929).
19 158 Md. 496, 148 A. 826 (1929).
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caused by the escape of objectionable fumes from a clean-
ing and dyeing establishment. The final decree restrained
the defendant from using gasolene or varnalene (a clean-
ing fluid) "in such quantity and manner as to be deleteri-
ous to the health of the neighborhood." To the defend-
ant's complaint that the decree was too vague, the court
replied:
"It is no part of the function of a court of equity
to tell the appellant how to run its business. Such a
court has the undoubted power to prevent it from so
using its property as to deprive others of the reason-
able enjoyment of their properties or in appropriate
cases it may grant affirmative relief by requiring a
wrongdoer to remedy the mischief he has caused, but
beyond that it cannot go. To require it, in such a case
as this, to conduct an inquiry involving the employ-
ment of highly skilled and technically trained advisors
and to formulate plans which would enable appellant
to conduct its plant so as to conform to its decree
verges upon absurdity."
The United States Supreme Court, however, did not con-
sider it an absurdity to place a somewhat similar nuisance
problem under technical advisement to enable the defend-
ant to carry on its business in a proper manner. In Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co.2" the operation of the defendant's
copper smelting plant caused the emission of destructive
sulphur fumes. The Court determined by means of the
evidence submitted that a certain quantity of escaping sul-
phur produced the harmful result. Therefore, the defend-
20 237 U. S. 474, 35 Sup. Ct. 631, 59 L. Ed. 1054 (1915). This case was
part of litigation extending over a period of eleven years. The state of
Georgia brought the original suit against the defendants, who were the
Tennessee Copper Co. and the Ducktown Sulphur, Copper and Iron Co., in
1905. The case was heard and determined in favor of the plaintiff in 1907,
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 27 Sup. Ct. 618, 57 L. Ed.
1038 (1907). By consent, time for entering a final decree was extended to
permit the defendants to devise some competent method of abating the
nuisance. The Tennessee Co. and the State came to an agreement regard-
ing proper operating conditions. The State promised to refrain from re-
questing an injunction prior to October, 1916, if the arrangements agreed
upon were carried out. The Ducktown Co. was unable to come to any
agreement with the State, and in 1914 the State asked for a perpetual in-
junction. The decree noted in the text above followed in 1915. The case
was retained for further action, and in 1916, a final decree was .given in
conformity with the findings of the court-appointed official, 240 U. S. 650,
36 Sup. Ct. 465, 60 L. Ed. 846 (1916).
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ant was ordered to keep daily records showing in detail the
result of the operations; a Court-appointed inspector was
given the right of access to the records; the defendant was
enjoined from permitting the escape of a certain maximum
amount of sulphur at all times; but a differential was set
up to take care of the seasonal factor, for the danger was
not as prevalent in the winter as it was in the summer.
The Court, in effect, gave an experimental decree, recog-
nizing that a just balance could not be struck without an
application of the trial and error method.2' It is submitted
that the principles behind such a decree are legally sound
and socially desirable. Just why it should not be the func-
tion of the equity court to help the defendant to escape
from what may be a perplexing dilemma is not readily
apparent. A maximum amount of co-operation on the part
of all parties concerned is the best assurance of a proper
solution; and it would indeed be an anomaly if the Court,
itself, should be the one to refuse to take a proper part.
In the second Maryland case, International Pocketbook
Workers' Union v. Orlove, involving a labor dispute, the
Court of Appeals, not referring to the earlier case, indi-
cated that the direction to the defendant should be as spe-
cific as possible.2 2 The decree below forbade the defend-
ants:
"From unlawfully interfering or causing any per-
son or persons to interfere with the business of the
plaintiffs, by threatening, intimidating or coercing the
employees of the plaintiff or any member of the fam-
ily of any such employees of person who may desire
to enter such employ; from injuring or destroying the
property or materials belonging to the plaintiffs; from
unlawfully assembling or causing persons to unlawfully
assemble or unlawfully parade on the streets adjoining
or in front of the property of the plaintiffs carrying
21 Cf. Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 Fed. (2nd) 736 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1927).
In abating a nuisance caused by blasting and the influx of dust from de-
fendant's stone crusher, the Court restrained blasting at night, and to such
a degree that the plaintiff's houses were jarred, and also limited the dust
to that escaping from. dust arresters operating at a maximum efficiency
determined by a court official.
22 The court (citing Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction, 112 if)
stated that in the past it had been customary to draft labor dispute in-
junctions in broad terms, but that the injustice of such a practice had
been made clear in certain instances. Can it be questioned that the injus-
tice of an indefinite decree is just as apparent in a nuisance case as it is
in a labor dispute?
248 [VOL. III
1939] MEADOWBROOK CLUB v. ALBERT 249
placards designed to create public prejudice against
the plaintiffs for the purpose of threatening, intimidat-
ing or coercing the employees of the plaintiffs, or for
the purpose of preventing by intimidation, coercion or
threats any person from working for the plaintiffs."
In reference to this part of the decree, the court stated
that it was:
"So broad and indefinite that opinions might dif-
fer too widely on the consistency of specific acts, and
well-intentioned pickets might too easily incur the
penalty of contempt of court without knowing it, ac-
cording as the court might or might not apply the in-
junction .. . The construction and application of the
injunctions being unpredictable, violations could surely
be avoided only by the abandonment of all picketing
and other efforts; and that, we think, cannot be re-
quired."
The Court went on to say that it would not lay down
any rigid rule, because what might be feasible in one situa-
tion might be impracticable in another. The case was re-
manded for the taking of further testimony to determine
what number of pickets would be reasonable in the strike,
and what should be the proper limits to their activities.
In the principal case, the defendant complained that the
decree was too indefinite, and that it amounted to a general
denial of the right to operate the dance floor. In answer,
the Court stated that there was no fiat prohibition against
such operation, but that the defendant was left free to adopt
its own means of so abating the nuisance that the plaintiffs
would be protected in their right to the reasonable enjoy-
ment of their property. A defendant under such instruc-
tion presumably would not be penalized if reasonable steps
promptly taken to abate the nuisance should not be entirely
satisfactory in the first instance. Yet, a more definite pro-
gram with a judicial sanction behind it would seem desir-
able in the absence of some special reason swaying the
Court against it.
An experimental decree to determine under what con-
ditions the defendant might carry on its business without
reasonable objection could have been used in the instant
case. However, when it was urged that the injunction
should not issue until the effects of a proposed roof over
the dance floor had been demonstrated, the court said that
250 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. III
the defendant's right to defer the restraint had been for-
feited by its failure to abate the nuisance over a two year
period in spite of persistent complaints. Whether the
Court would have called for a more definite decree in the
absence of this special reason for refusing the defendant
greater protection is conjectural. 21
MANUAL TRANSFER OF DEED TO GRANTEE
ON PAROL CONDITION
Buchwald v. Buchwald et al.1
In this case a father-in-law attempted to make an abso-
lute conveyance upon an oral condition. The grantor wished
to avoid the possibility of his son's wife claiming an inter-
est in the land in the event that his son should fail to sur-
vive him. To prevent this contingency he delivered the
deed to his son subject to the oral condition that it was not
to become operative unless he predeceased his son; and in
the event anything should happen to the son, the father
was to procure the deed and destroy it. The grantee placed
the deed in a safe to which the father had access, but de-
posited it in his own personal drawer to which the father
never went. There was insufficient evidence to show that
the grantor had any other control over the instrument than
to remove it in the event that he should survive his son.
The deed was not recorded until after the grantor's death,
23 Definite decrees have been used in situations of similar difficulty. (1)
Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 A. 24 (1910). Here the court
was asked to abate a noise nuisance caused by the operation of the defend-
ant's iron works. The court said: "In a case like the present where the
annoyance arises from the conduct of a business which Is not a nuisance
per se, a strong effort should be made to conserve the rights of all parties,
and an important question is: Can the noise by any reasonable means be
so moderated as to accord with the degree of quietness the plaintiff has a
right to enjoy; and if it can, by what means." The court looked at the
testimony and enjoined the use of noisy machinery during hours when the
plaintiffs would be likely to be at rest, and also restrained the use of the
machinery while the windows in the plant were open, for the noise was
much more objectionable when the windows were in such a position. (2)
Peragallo v. Luner, 99 N. J. Equity 726, 133 A. 543 (1926) supra circa n.
14, where, after an actual investigation had been made by a court official
to determine the extent of the disturbance, the use of the defendant's bowl-
ing alleys was enjoined only during the hours that the plaintiff restaurant
owner was apt to have his heaviest trade. (3) Gilbough v. West Side
Amusement Co., 64 N. J. Equity 27, 53 A. 289 (1902) supra circa n. 11,
where the court restrained the defendant from permitting noise on its
premises during the time when the annoyance was most disturbing to the
plaintiffs.
' 199 A. 800 (Md. 1938).
